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I. INTRODUCTION
Two roommates, Geoffrey and Nicholas, rented property from their landlord,
Theresa Smith.1 One month, their landlord noticed the water bill was higher than
usual, and so she went to investigate the properties she owned.2 Theresa thought
there was probably just a water leak.3 She approached the property rented by
Geoffrey and Nicholas and used her own key to enter their residence.4 Theresa
noticed contraband inside, so she decided to contact the authorities.5 After that,
she allowed a law enforcement officer to enter the residence without a warrant.6
Neither Geoffrey nor Nicholas were home during either entry to protest.7 If the
officer viewed only what Theresa described, the search would likely be lawful
under the private search doctrine.8 This is an example of how the private search
doctrine works.9 Now imagine what someone could do with the password to
another person’s computer or cell phone.10
Under the private search doctrine, when a private party violates a person’s
privacy by conducting a search, a government official can follow-up that search
and conduct one of their own without a warrant, so long as the second search
1. United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 499 (6th Cir. 2003).
2. Id. at 499–500.
3. Id. at 500.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 501, 510.
7. Id. at 500.
8. These facts are from United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 501, 510 (6th Cir. 2003). Although some
circuits hold the private search doctrine applies to residences and some do not, see infra Part VIII, this particular
case held the private search did not justify the warrantless entry because the officer’s search exceeded the scope
of the landlord’s. Id. at 510.
9. Infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Sparks (Johnson), 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009,
195 L. Ed. 2d 222 (2016), and cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 34, 196 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2016)
(law enforcement officer searched a cell phone under the private search doctrine). References to cell phones and
modern cell phones in this Comment are references to “smart phones” specifically—smart phones are small,
lightweight, minicomputers with many uses. What Are the Different Types of Computer?, REFERENCE.COM,
https://www.reference.com/technology/different-types-computer-7c93526a14be5dcf (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
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does not exceed the scope of the first.11 The Supreme Court of the United States
created the private search doctrine in 1984 in U.S. v. Jacobsen, where it held that
because a private party frustrated the privacy interests of the defendant, the
government actor was free to view the contents because it no longer constituted
an unreasonable search.12 When applied to digital devices, the doctrine had been
used broadly—allowing police to search any files on a zip drive, for example,
simply because a private party knew what was on it.13 But in recent years, courts
have been in disagreement about the scope of this doctrine due to the influential
decision Riley v. California.14
Riley explained that modern cell phones “hold for many Americans ‘the
privacies of life.’”15 They have the capacity to store many different types of
information, from photographs to Internet browsing history.16 They can contain
many sensitive records and even private information that cannot be found in a
home.17 The use of cell phones is now so pervasive that “the proverbial visitor
from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”18
This concept has led recent courts to favor the individual’s privacy interests in
digital devices and narrow the scope of the private search doctrine when it comes
to searching them.19
The Sixth Circuit adopted a narrow scope of the private search doctrine in
United States v. Lichtenberger, following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Johnson v. United States.20 The policy under Riley v. California that cell phones
are as private as the home under the Fourth Amendment shows that courts are not
only correct in narrowing the doctrine, but that cell phones and similar digital
devices should be exempt from the private search doctrine altogether.21
This Comment first explains the private search doctrine and its origins.22 It
then explains the two private search cases applying the doctrine to digital

11. Stephen LaBrecque, “Virtual Certainty” in a Digital World: The Sixth Circuit’s Application of the
Private Search Doctrine to Digital Storage Devices in United States v. Lichtenberger, 57 B.C. L. REV. ESUPPLEMENT 177, 181 (2016).
12. 466 U.S. 109, 119 (1984).
13. See Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012) (the mother brought a zip drive to the police,
claiming she reviewed its contents and knew it contained child pornography).
14. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488
(6th Cir. 2015).
15. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
16. Id. at 2489.
17. Id. at 2491.
18. Id. at 2484.
19. See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487–488 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting the Riley
decision’s analysis of phones adds weight to one side of the scale when balancing individual and state interests).
20. Id. at 488.
21. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (comparing privacy interests in phones to a home).
22. See infra Part II.
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devices, Rann and Runyan.23 Then, this Comment dives into the case Riley v.
California, and explains the ripple effect Riley created on legal treatment of
technology.24 Next, this Comment shows the emerging circuit splits following the
Riley decision, created by Lichtenberger and Johnson in their narrowing of the
private search doctrine.25 This Comment shows that the emerging policy
protecting technology from government searches is likely to influence future
courts in continuing to narrow the doctrine.26 Finally, it argues that because of the
high privacy interests in cellphones, as the Riley court explained, cellphones and
similar technology should be exempt from the private search doctrine
altogether.27
II. THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches of peoples’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”28 Under
that amendment, the government may only search by first obtaining a warrant.29
But government agents are able to avoid the warrant requirement in special cases
through the “private search doctrine,” as created by U.S. v. Jacobsen,30 where,
after a search by a private party, a replicated warrantless search by a government
agent is not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.31 This Part
explains the U.S. v. Jacobsen decision, which is the basis for the private search
doctrine.32 Then, it describes the policies underlying the doctrine.33
In U.S. v. Jacobsen, the private freight carrier Federal Express had
accidentally damaged a package with a forklift, and pursuant to company policy,
employees opened the package to examine its contents.34 Upon inspection, the
Federal Express employees observed a series of zip-lock bags containing white
powder and contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration.35 The federal agent
saw the same white powder in the package and opened the bags, identifying the
substance as cocaine.36 The agents rewrapped the package and obtained a warrant
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
Id.
466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
Id. at 117–19.
Infra Part II.
Infra Part II.
466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 111–12.
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to search the place to which it was addressed, eventually arresting and charging
the respondents in that case.37 The issue before the court was whether the Fourth
Amendment required the federal agent to obtain a warrant before he opened the
bag and tested the cocaine.38
The Jacobsen Court held that the removal and inspection of the substance
within the plastic bags in the damaged package infringed no legitimate
expectation of privacy, and therefore did not constitute a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.39
In its holding, the Court in Jacobsen reasoned that the Fourth Amendment is
implicated only if the authorities use information that has not already frustrated
the respondent’s expectation of privacy.40 However, the expectation of privacy in
that case had already been frustrated by the Federal Express employees when
they inspected the package, and so the court held the respondents had no privacy
interest in the contents of the package once unsealed and examined by the
employees.41 “The agent’s viewing of what a private party had freely made
available for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”42
In assessing whether the actual testing of the cocaine was a search, the court
reasoned that the suspicious nature of the material made it virtually certain the
substance tested was in fact contraband.43 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the
safeguards of a warrant could at best only minimally advance Fourth Amendment
interests because the trace amount of material lost to the drug test has a de
minimis impact on any property interest.44
Since the search of a private party frustrated the expectation of privacy of the
respondent, and the testing of the cocaine was such a minimal impact on any
property interest, the agent’s search did not infringe on Fourth Amendment
protections.45
The policies underlying the private search doctrine originated both from
Jacobsen, and from an earlier case, Burdeau v. McDowell.46 Decided in the early
1900s, Burdeau analyzed what constitutional protections individuals are entitled
to under the language of the Fourth Amendment.47 The United States Supreme
37. Id. at 112.
38. Id. at 111.
39. Id. at 119.
40. Id. at 117.
41. Id. at 119, 121.
42. Id. at 119.
43. Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 119, 125.
46. 256 U.S. 465 (1921); After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2016,
11:15 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/743564/after-riley-circuits-narrow-private-search-doctrine (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
47. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474 (1921).
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Court explained both the history and origin of the Fourth Amendment to show
the framers created the Amendment as a restraint on sovereign authority.48
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protects against government action, not
private action, even if the private action is unlawful.49 Under this reasoning, once
a party’s expectation of privacy is frustrated by a private search, the government
is not barred by the Fourth Amendment from using the then non-private
information.50 Together, Burdeau v. McDowell’s policy and the U.S. v. Jacobsen
decision created the private search doctrine.51
III. THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO DIGITAL DEVICES
Within private search doctrine jurisprudence, there are two notable cases that
applied the private search doctrine to digital devices, which provided an example
for other courts on how the doctrine could be applied to these types of devices.52
The first of these cases to apply the doctrine was in the Fifth Circuit,53 and the
second was in the Seventh Circuit, which adopted the approach used by the
Fifth.54 This Part illustrates these two cases.55
In United States v. Runyan, the defendant’s wife turned over a complete
collection of disks, alleging that she found child pornography on some of them.56
The Fifth Circuit held that the police exceeded the scope of the initial search
because they were not “substantially certain that all of the disks contained child
pornography.”57 The Fifth Circuit created its “substantial certainty” guideline,
analogizing electronic devices to physical containers, in hopes that police will not
engage in “‘fishing expeditions’ by opening closed containers.”58 Notably, the
Fifth Circuit also held that the government was able to search the contents of an
electronic device once a private party viewed at least one file.59 The Court

48. Id. at 475.
49. Id.; see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (“a wrongful search or seizure
conducted by a private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment and . . . such private wrongdoing does not
deprive the government of the right to use evidence that it has acquired lawfully”).
50. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
51. Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984).
52. See infra Part III (discussing the two notable cases that applied the private search doctrine to digital
devices).
53. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001).
54. Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012).
55. Infra Part III.
56. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 453–54 (5th Cir. 2001); After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine,
supra note 46.
57. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464.
58. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
59. Id.
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reasoned that holding otherwise might over-deter police from thorough searches
of containers where the owners had diminished expectations of privacy.60
In Rann v. Atchison,61 the Seventh Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning.62 There, a daughter and her mother brought the father’s zip drive to
the police, and claimed the drive contained child pornography.63 Because the
mother and daughter knew what was on the device, the Court reasoned, the
police officers were “substantially certain” the zip drive contained child
pornography.64 The Fifth Circuit held that the search, therefore, did not exceed
the scope of the private search, and the officers were able to search the entire zip
drive.65 Before Riley v. California, both of these cases demonstrated how courts
applied the private search doctrine to electronic devices.66
IV. THE RILEY V. CALIFORNIA RIPPLE EFFECT
The United States Supreme Court took a new turn when it announced in the
precedential case Riley v. California that individuals have a high privacy interest
in their cell phones.67 This Part first explains the decision,68 and then explains its
potential legal impact.69
A. Riley v. California
The court in Riley v. California handled the issue of whether the digital
information on a cell phone may be searched incident to arrest.70 There,
petitioner David Riley was pulled over for driving without proper registration
stickers.71 During that stop, the officer learned Riley also had a suspended
license, and impounded the car—finding handguns under the car’s hood.72 While
arresting Riley, the officer seized his cell phone from his pocket and discovered
evidence associating Riley with the “Bloods” street gang.73

60. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465.
61. 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012).
62. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
63. Id.
64. Rann, 689 F.3d at 838.
65. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
66. See Rann, 689 F.3d at 838; and United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying
the private search doctrine to an electronic device).
67. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
68. Infra Part IV.A.
69. Infra Part IV.B.
70. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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In holding that the officer could not search the contents of the smart phone
incident to arrest,74 the Riley court balanced the degree to which the search
intrudes upon a person’s privacy against the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.75 The governmental interests
furthered from a search incident to arrest—protecting the officer’s safety and
preventing destruction of evidence—do not apply to the search of digital
information on a cell phone, according to the Riley court.76 Digital data cannot be
used by itself as a weapon to harm an officer making an arrest, and any concern
of destruction of evidence for a digital device is not enough because it is unlikely
to occur.77
In weighing the privacy interests of the individual, the Riley court noted how
smart phones are highly distinguishable from their older telephone counterparts.78
“Modern cell phones implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by
the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”79 The devices are in fact
minicomputers with enormous storage space capable of storing the equivalent of
millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.80
Therefore, the Court decided, the storage capacity of modern cell phones has
large consequences for privacy.81 Riley then ruled that the information contained
on a cell phone, because of these high privacy interests, could not be searched
incident to arrest without a warrant.82
The Riley v. California decision did not implicate the private search doctrine
directly, rather the holding was directed only at searches incident to arrest.83
However, the analysis in Riley has impacted courts and scholars citing the
decision.84
B. Phone Sweet Phone: The Impacts of Riley
Riley v. California contained deep analysis on the individual privacy interests
implicated by searching cellphones.85 First, the court compared cell phones to a
home.86 The Court explained that modern phones not only contain very sensitive
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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Id. at 2478.
Id. at 2484–85.
Id. at 2485.
Id. at 2488–89.
Id.
Id. at 2489.
Id.
Id. at 2493.
Id.
Infra Part IV.B.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
Id. at 2491.
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personal information that was previously found in the home, but also personal
information that is never found in a home; cell phones therefore expose to the
government even more than what can be found in an exhaustive search of a
house.87 The Court held that not only was the officer in Riley not able search the
phone incident to arrest, but generally that a warrant is required before a search
of a cell phone.88 The following subpart analyzes how Riley has affected
reasoning in other areas of law,89 and how that reasoning affects the private
search doctrine.90
1. The Potential Effects on a Different Doctrine: The Third-Party Doctrine
Following Riley’s analysis on the privacy interests involved with the modern
cell phone, many scholars have alluded to advancements in the law based on
Riley’s analysis, such as extending protections to the third-party doctrine—where
privacy interests in information are forfeited at the moment of conveyance to a
third party—or even removing the third-party doctrine altogether.91
The Riley Court explained that much of the important data viewed or used on
cell phones is not actually stored on the device itself, which further complicates
the privacy interests at stake.92 Instead, modern phones access data contained
elsewhere, known as “cloud computing.”93 Scholars have explained that the
third-party doctrine still applies to cell phones despite the Riley decision, because
Riley did not address implications on the third-party doctrine.94 One scholar,
Joshua Vittor, urged that Fourth Amendment protections be expanded in the face
of rapidly expanding technology.95 For example, in United States v. Warshak, the
Sixth Circuit limited the scope of the third-party doctrine as applied to emails

87. Id.
88. Id. at 2493.
89. Infra Part III.B.1.
90. Infra Part III.B.2.
91. The third-party doctrine holds that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in, and no Fourth
Amendment protection of, information that is given to third parties. Ryan Watzel, Riley’s Implications for
Fourth Amendment Protection in the Cloud, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 73, 74 (2014). See also Joshua Vittor, What
Would a Martian Think of Cell Phones? The Third-Party Doctrine and Technological Extensions of the Human
Self, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 255 (2016); Laurie Buchan Serafino, “I Know My Rights, So You Go’n Need a
Warrant for That”: The Fourth Amendment, Riley’s Impact, and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party Clouds,
19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154 (2014); George M. Dery III & Kevin Meehan, A New Digital Divide?
Considering the Implications of Riley v. California’s Warrant Mandate for Cell Phone Searches, 18 U. PA. J.L.
& SOC. CHANGE 311 (2015).
92. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
93. Id. Cloud computing is when data is stored and accessed over the internet, instead of being stored on a
device’s own hard drive. Eric Griffith, What is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG (May 3, 2016),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
94. Vittor, supra note 91, at 258.
95. Id. at 272.
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because emails have become an essential form of communication; the Fourth
Amendment must keep pace with ever-evolving technologies.96 This is why,
Vittor explained, the third-party doctrine is perhaps not suitable for a growing
digital age.97 Thus, following Riley v. California, there are potential implications
to expand this other doctrine—the third-party doctrine.98
2. The Reasoning for Expanding the Third-Party Doctrine After Riley,
Applied to the Private Search Doctrine
Since scholars like Vittor urge that the third-party doctrine is inappropriate in
a digital age where technologies are ever changing, it is equally important to
consider how the digital age impacts the private search doctrine.99 United States
v. Warshak limited the third-party doctrine because emails have become essential
communication; therefore, as people become dependent on their modern phones,
courts could follow this same line of reasoning and limit the private search
doctrine because phones are essential methods of communication.100 The Riley
analysis has not only urged that police cannot search cell phones incident to
arrest, but it has apparently shown that the high privacy expectations in modern
phones created a new policy for technology.101 The policy is that cell phones are
not simply physical objects, they are provided a high expectation of privacy in
Riley because they “hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”102 This is
the theory used by scholars in advocating for a revised third-party doctrine,103
and it applies similarly to the private search doctrine.
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Following Riley, two recent decisions have joined together in narrowing the
private search doctrine.104 These two new cases created a circuit split with the
pre-Riley cases.105 One of these recent decisions, United States v. Lichtenberger,

96. Id. at 265.
97. Id. at 266.
98. Id.
99. See id. (mentioning that the third-party doctrine is inappropriate in a digital age).
100. See id. at 265 (explaining the reasoning in Warshak).
101. See id. at 258–59 (explaining how the deep concerns emphasized in Riley offered a theoretical
solution to revise the third-party doctrine).
102. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
103. See Vittor, supra note 91, at 258-259 (explaining how the deep concerns emphasized in Riley
offered a theoretical solution to revise the third-party doctrine); Watzel, supra note 92, at 76 (noting how Riley
suggested that cloud-based data may nevertheless be afforded Fourth Amendment protection).
104. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
105. Compare United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487 (6th Cir. 2015); and United States v.
Sparks (Johnson), 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009, 195 L. Ed. 2d 222
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cited Riley and claimed that “the nature of the searched device greatly increased
the potential privacy interests at stake.”106 This came shortly after another postRiley case that applied the private search doctrine narrowly, Johnson v. United
States.107 Both of these post-Riley decisions stress the intrusiveness of police
searching personal electronics.108 This Part first explains what happened in these
two cases,109 and then examines the circuit split between them and the two
notable pre-Riley cases.110 Lastly, this Part examines whether the Sixth Circuit
decided the Lichtenberger case properly, ultimately concluding that the Sixth
Circuit was moving in the right direction.111
A. The New Decisions
In Johnson v. United States,112 the Eleventh Circuit considered the issue of
whether the warrantless search of a cell phone following a private search
exceeded the scope of the private search doctrine.113 In that case, two defendants,
Alan Johnson and Jennifer Sparks, unwittingly left their cell phone in a
Walmart.114 One of the store’s employees found the phone and agreed to return it
to the defendants.115 However, the employee decided to peek at the contents of
the phone, and upon discovering child pornography, instead decided to turn it
over to the police.116 Both defendants were indicted for possession and
production of child pornography.117
On the private search doctrine issue, the Johnson court held the police
officer’s search of the cell phone exceeded the scope of the Walmart employee’s
private search.118 This was because the officer viewed one video on the phone the
employee had not previously watched, meaning the governmental search did not

(2016), and cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 34, 196 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2016); with Rann
v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012); and United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001) (the Sixth
and 11th Circuits disagree with the Fifth and Seventh over how narrowly to apply the private search doctrine).
106. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
107. United States v. Sparks (Johnson), 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009,
195 L. Ed. 2d 222 (2016), and cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 34, 196 L. Ed. 2d 46
(2016).
108. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
109. Infra Part V.A.
110. Infra Part V.B.
111. Infra Part V.C.
112. Johnson, 806 F.3d 1323.
113. Id. at 1335.
114. Id. at 1329.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1330.
118. Id. at 1335. Even though the court still held the subsequent search warrant valid and affirmed the
district court’s denial of the Defendants’ motion to suppress the child pornography. Id.
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replicate the private search and went beyond the scope of the private search
doctrine.119 In its analysis, the Johnson court noted that approving of the search
would be inconsistent with Riley because cell phones hold “the privacies of life,”
and the storage capacities of phones suggest that a search warrant must specify
what part of its contents may be searched.120 Because the employee’s search did
not expose every part of information contained in the cell phone, no exception to
the warrant requirement could have excused the officer’s viewing of that
particular video on the phone.121
Just a couple months following Johnson in early 2015, the Sixth Circuit
decided Lichtenberger.122 Lichtenberger is similar to Johnson, but the device
searched was a laptop computer rather than a cell phone.123 In that case the court
decided whether an officer’s search of a laptop exceeded the scope of the private
search, where the defendant’s girlfriend had found child pornography.124 The
police arrested the defendant for failing to register as a sex offender.125 After his
arrest, his girlfriend Karley Holmes looked through his computer and discovered
numerous images of child pornography.126 Holmes then contacted the police.127
When officers arrived at the house Holmes showed them some of the images on
the laptop.128 Holmes could not recall if these were the same images she had
viewed previously, and the officer testified he might have had Holmes open files
“other than those she had previously opened.”129
The Lichtenberger court held the warrantless search of the defendant’s laptop
exceeded the scope of the private search.130 The court emphasized the “virtual
certainty” requirement from the Jacobsen case,131 and found the officer’s lack of
“virtual certainty” when he viewed the images dispositive.132 The court refused to
apply the private search doctrine where the search exceeded the scope of the
initial private search.133 Just like in Johnson, the Lichtenberger court cited Riley
as instructive.134 The court decided that under Riley, “the nature of the electronic

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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Id.
Id.
United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 479.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 488.
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device greatly increases the potential privacy interests at stake, adding weight to
one side of the scale while the other remains the same.”135 Applying this concept
to the private search doctrine, the court noted that this “shift” of the scale
manifested itself in the “virtual certainty” requirement from Jacobsen.136 The
officer in that case needed to search the laptop with “virtual certainty” that his
search would not show him any more than what Holmes had already described to
him.137 When the officer was uncertain that Holmes had opened the same files
from the initial search, there was plainly no virtual certainty in that case.138
Both post-Riley cases emphasized the importance of “virtual certainty,” and
treated each individual file on the devices as their own container, not allowing
the government search to exceed the specific files viewed in the initial private
search.139 The way these two cases treated files stored on an electronic device
differed greatly from the two notable pre-Riley cases—United States v. Runyan140
and Rann v. Atchison.141
B. The Circuit Split with United States v. Runyan and Rann v. Atchison
Runyan and Rann can be distinguished from the post-Riley cases in the sense
that the objects searched were disks and a zip drive rather than a personal cellular
phone and laptop computer.142 But all of these cases are similar because the
government searched personal electronic files.143
Even though Runyan and Rann applied a “substantial certainty” test, and
Lichtenberger applied a “virtual certainty” test, there is little functional
difference, if any, between the two.144 Runyan read Jacobsen in combination with
other precedential cases, declaring that searching a privately-searched container
is not necessarily problematic if the police have substantial certainty of what
they would find.145 Lichtenberger, in interpreting Jacobsen, decided the officer
had to be virtually certain his search would not uncover any more than the
private party had told him.146 Jacobsen provided both of these standards, and

1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009, 195 L. Ed. 2d 222 (2016), and cert. denied sub nom.
Johnson v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 34, 196 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2016) (discussing Riley v. California).
135. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
140. 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001).
141. 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012).
142. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
143. Id.
144. LaBrecque, supra note 11, at 185.
145. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463.
146. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2015).
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although these tests are worded differently, they are functionally equivalent.147
Both the pre-Riley and post-Riley cases were applying the same test.148
What created the different results between the pre-Riley and post-Riley cases
was which specific container the police needed virtual certainty in.149 What is the
right measuring unit: the file, the folder, or the physical device?150 There was one
main shift in applying the private search doctrine—allowing police to search only
each individual file the private party searched as opposed to the entire device.151
The post-Riley cases have thus narrowed the scope of the private search doctrine,
holding a warrantless search by police cannot go beyond those electronic files
viewed by the private party during the prior search.152 In essence, the post-Riley
cases treated each individual file on the devices as their own “container” for
purposes of the private search doctrine.153
C. Were Lichtenberger and Johnson Decided Properly?
Are Lichtenberger and Johnson correct in narrowly applying the private
search doctrine?154 One scholar, for example, believes the the heavy focus on
individuals’ privacy was inappropriate in Lichtenberger, and that the Sixth
Circuit improperly ignored the balanced approach of precedent in other circuits
while citing a case unrelated to the private search doctrine.155 This subpart
considers whether the approach taken by Lichtenberger and Johnson was an
appropriate change to the private search doctrine, considering their large focus on
Riley, concluding the shift was well warranted.156

147. LaBrecque, supra note 11, at 185.
148. Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Circuit Split on Private Search Doctrine for Computers, THE
WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/20/sixthcircuit-creates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-for-computers/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
149. Jeffrey Koelemay, Laptop Search for Child Porn Suppressed; Officer Lacked ‘Virtual Certainty’ of
Contents, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 26, 2015), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XBGSG59
K000000?jcsearch=dk%253Abna%2520a0g6z7e5y5#jcite (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
150. Kerr, supra note 148.
151. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
152. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
153. Koelemay, supra note 149.
154. Infra Part V.C.
155. Katie Matejka, United States v. Lichtenberger: The Sixth Circuit Improperly Narrowed the Private
Search Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment in a Case of Child Pornography on a Digital Device, 49 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 177, 198 (2015).
156. Infra Part IV.C.
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1. Were the Post-Riley Cases Correct in Narrowing the Private Search
Doctrine?
One scholar who wrote on the issue, Katie Matejka, argued the Lichtenberger
court improperly focused on protecting data privacy.157 This scholar contended
the use of Riley in the court’s analysis was inappropriate because it is not a
private search case.158 This subpart considers whether the case was decided
properly.159
Matejka argued the Lichtenberger court ignored the balanced approach of
other circuits and ignored its own precedent.160 In 2010, before Riley was
decided, the Sixth Circuit held that officers who looked through a photo album of
pornographic images of children did not exceed the scope of the private search
because they had been told of the album’s contents.161 Similarly, only a couple
years prior, the Sixth Circuit also held that a government search of a storage
locker containing pornographic images of children did not exceed the scope of
the initial private search by a storage facility employee.162 Both of these pre-Riley
private search cases can be distinguished from Lichtenberger because
Lichtenberger was about data on a digital device while the prior cases were
not.163 However, Matejka drew an analogy between a digital file and a physical
one, “the rationale extending the private search doctrine . . . to digital items is
very clear because the folder containing all of the images of child pornography
on Lichtenberger’s laptop is comparable to the album of photos in Bowers and
the storage unit in Richards.”164 In all of these cases, Matejka urged, the officers
were certain the container in question contained child pornography, but could
have also incidentally contained something other than child pornography.165
Therefore, Matejka argued, the Lichtenberger court should not have treated the
laptop differently, and erred when it applied the private search doctrine narrowly
to each individual file of child pornography viewed by the private party.166
Although it is true the Sixth Circuit applied the private search doctrine in a
way that appeared inconsistent with its precedent, it correctly cited and applied
Riley because Riley contains influential analysis of a new policy that the United
States Supreme Court intended to adopt.167 Riley is not a private search case,
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Matejka, supra note 155, at 178.
Id. at 196.
Infra Part V.C.1.
Matejka, supra note 155, at 196.
United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 2010); Matejka, supra note 155, at 185–86.
United States v. Richards, 301 F. App’x 480, 483 (6th Cir. 2008); Matejka, supra note 155, at 186.
Matejka, supra note 155, at 194.
Id.
Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 195.
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–89 (2014) (examining the privacy interests in cell
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meaning it is not dispositive as to how broadly a search can occur under the
private search doctrine.168 Regardless, Riley thoroughly explained the importance
cellular phones hold in the lives of Americans, and emphasized this heightened
privacy interest.169 The holding of Riley was centered not on the fact that the cell
phone was searched incident to arrest, but on weighing the privacy interests in
phones—they contain a broad array of sensitive records and information.170 “Our
holding . . . is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from a search;
it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a
cell phone is seized incident to arrest.”171
Therefore, the Court based the holding of Riley v. California not on the
mechanics of a search incident to arrest, but on a broader policy—that modern
cell phones deserve special protection because of the increasingly private nature
of information contained within.172 Additionally, the Court in Riley specifically
rejected the analogy between the kinds of data found on a modern cell phone and
information contained in physical places: “[Saying this kind of data is materially
indistinguishable from physical items] is like saying a ride on horseback is
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting
from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together.”173
Consequently, the Sixth Circuit’s use of Riley as instructive was not
improper because the United States Supreme Court applied not a rigid rule about
the search incident to arrest doctrine, but a policy about the privacy interests in
modern cell phones.174 The Sixth Circuit in Lichtenberger did not cite a search
incident to arrest case on accident.175 Instead, Lichtenberger took careful note of
the qualities in these electronic devices that implicate privacy interests,176 and
balancing the shift in the scale of personal interests versus governmental interests
by using its more stringent threshold.177 The Sixth Circuit in Lichtenberger
merely followed Riley’s example of protecting the privacy of information
contained in a personal digital device after weighing the interests of both sides.178
phones).
168. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
169. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488–95 (analyzing the privacy interests in modern cell phones).
170. Id. at 2491.
171. Id. at 2493.
172. See id. at 2495 (holding cell phones exempt from the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement).
173. Id. at 2488.
174. See id. at 2495 (because phones “are not just another technological convenience,” holding the
privacies of life, they are worthy of the protections the founders fought for).
175. See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Riley as instructive,
and fully illustrating the holding in that case, including that it related to searches incident to arrest).
176. Id. at 487–88.
177. Id. at 488.
178. See id. at 487–88 (applying the virtual certainty threshold after agreeing with the Riley court that
privacy-related concerns in electronic devices are weighty because they contain “1) many kinds of data, 2) in
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Lichtenberger and Johnson are not coincidences; the courts intended to apply
Riley’s policy.179 With technology continuously developing, with new phones,
computers, and tablets being released every few months, the decision to agree
with the Riley Court about the privacy interests that digital devices implicate is
not only warranted, but vitally important.180
2. Did the Post-Riley Cases Correctly Apply the Narrowed Private Search
Doctrine?
Another legal researcher who wrote on the private search doctrine, Stephen
LaBrecque, argued the Lichtenberger court may have misapplied the private
search doctrine, even though it correctly narrowed the scope of it.181 This subpart
considers the issue of how the post-Riley cases should have applied the
doctrine.182
LaBrecque asserts that, although the Sixth Circuit correctly identified the
proper scope for the private search doctrine in Lichtenberger, it failed in applying
the test to the facts of the case.183 LaBrecque explained that the officers in
Lichtenberger had virtual certainty they would not reveal anything else of
significance because they were viewing multiple files displayed as thumbnail
images.184 He urged the Lichtenberger court was mainly concerned with
accidental discovery of medical records, bank statements, or other personal
documents—but because the officer viewed the files as thumbnails, the officer
could not have seen any text-based documents.185 Therefore, LaBrecque stated,
there was no risk the officer would accidentally discover other documents.186
When applying the private search doctrine to see if the governmental search
exceeded the scope of the private search, courts measure how much information
the government stands to gain, in relation to how certain the government is that it
will find such information.187 This measure considers the circumstances
surrounding the governmental search, and so LaBrecque properly noted that the
vast amounts, 3) corresponding to a long swath of time”).
179. Id. at 487; United States v. Sparks (Johnson), 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 2009, 195 L. Ed. 2d 222 (2016), and cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 34,
196 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2016).
180. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (phones are used so much that an outsider
would think they are part of human anatomy).
181. LaBrecque, supra note 11, at 189.
182. Infra Part V.C.2.
183. LaBrecque, supra note 11, at 189.
184. Id. at 191. “A thumbnail is a small image that represents a larger one . . . often used to provide
snapshots of several images in a single space.” Thumbnail Definition, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.
com/definition/thumbnail (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
185. LaBrecque, supra note 11, at 191.
186. Id.
187. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 485–86 (6th Cir. 2015).
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small size and nature of thumbnail images affect what information officers learn
during a search.188
However, the mere existence of thumbnail images should not be dispositive
on this issue because what information they display is unknown to the officer
before the search.189 A disorganized person can intermingle different types of
documents together in a single folder, and thumbnails can appear larger or
smaller, showing more or less information.190 Therefore, the mere nature of
thumbnails is not enough to conclude that the officer in Lichtenberger had
sufficient “virtual certainty” the laptop’s contents would not tell him any more
than he was told by the private party.191
In fact, the Lichtenberger court emphasized that the private party was just not
sure if she showed the officer the same images she had seen in her original
search.192 This significantly influenced the court to conclude that the officer had
no virtual certainty he would not discover anything new.193 The officer may have
seen images the private party simply did not see in the initial search.194
Therefore, although the consideration of thumbnail images had an effect on what
information the officer actually learned during a search, the Lichtenberger
decision seems appropriate considering the circumstances.195
After Johnson and Lichtenberger applied the private search doctrine
narrowly to digital devices, they created a circuit split with the pre-Riley private
search cases Rann and Runyan.196 Although their decisions contrasted prior cases
that applied the private search doctrine to digital devices, the result is likely
appropriate because the cases applied a new policy from Riley v. California
meant to protect privacy interests in electronic devices.197
VI. SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNOLOGY: PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
With the new Lichtenberger and Johnson decisions in such stark contrast to
the pre-Riley private search cases Rann and Runyan, other circuits that have yet

188. See id. at 485 (courts evaluate the reasonableness of an invasion with the facts as they existed at the
time the invasion occurred).
189. See, e.g., id. at 486 (noting that police must search with a particular amount of certainty as to what
they will find).
190. See Thumbnail Definition, supra note 185 (thumbnails can vary in size);
191. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488 (explaining virtual certainty).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 488–89.
196. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
197. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (phones are worthy of the protections the
founders fought for).
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to decide the issue will have decisions to make.198 This Part considers what
direction future circuits will take in deciding private search cases.199 Then, this
Part predicts that future cases will be decided in accordance with the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits and use the narrower threshold, treating each file like its own
“container.”200 With Lichtenberger and Johnson in contrast with Runyan and
Rann, future courts will need to decide the proper scope of the private search
doctrine—whether they choose to apply the broader or narrower approach.201
This Part considers which approach is likely to be applied in the future,202 and
how that standard will likely be applied to other devices.203
A. The Right Legal Standard for the Private Search Doctrine
What is the right scope for the private search doctrine?204 Runyan treated
computer disks as their own “containers,” claiming that its analysis using
substantial certainty was the most sensible result because it discouraged police
from conducting “fishing expeditions” while simultaneously avoiding overdeterrence of police searches.205 Similarly, Rann treated the zip drive as its own
“container” when searched by a private party, instead of the files within.206 Both
of these cases held that police did not exceed the scope of the first search, when
they treated the entire digital device as the “container.”207 In both Runyan and
Rann, the privacy interests in all of the files were frustrated by a private party
viewing only some of the files.208 But Runyan and Rann’s application of the
private search doctrine analogized digital files to physical containers in an effort
to harmonize an issue around container searches.209 “In the context of a search
involving a number of closed containers . . . opening a container that was not

198. Compare Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 487; and United States v. Sparks (Johnson), 806 F.3d 1323,
1336 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009, 195 L. Ed. 2d 222 (2016), and cert. denied sub nom.
Johnson v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 34, 196 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2016); with Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir.
2012); and United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001) (the Sixth and 11th Circuits disagree with the
Fifth and Seventh over how narrowly to apply the private search doctrine).
199. Infra Part VI.
200. Infra Part VI.
201. Compare Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 487; and Johnson, 806 F.3d at 1336; with Rann, 689 F.3d 832;
and Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (the Sixth and 11th Circuits disagree with the Fifth and Seventh over how narrowly
to apply the private search doctrine).
202. Infra Part VI.A.
203. Infra Part VI.B.
204. Infra Part VI.A.
205. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46; Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465.
206. Rann, 689 F.3d at 838.
207. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 462; Rann, 689 F.3d at 838.
208. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.
209. Id.

225

2017 / Private Search Doctrine Following Riley v. California
opened by private searchers would not necessarily be problematic if the police
knew with substantial certainty . . . what they would find inside.”210
However, the analogy between electronic devices and physical containers
falls flat after the United States Supreme Court explained in Riley v. California
that the type of data contained in cell phones and stored in physical places is, in
fact, very different.211 The Court stated that cell phones by their very nature
implicate privacy concerns “far beyond those implicated by the search of a
cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”212 Therefore, the pre-Riley applications of
the private search doctrine to digital devices were based on an analogy that was,
in essence, disapproved of by the Supreme Court.213
The more narrow approach to the doctrine applied by Lichtenberger and
Johnson treats each individual file as a “container,” as opposed to the entire
device.214 This means when a private party views only some of the files, it does
not frustrate the expectation of privacy in the other, non-viewed files.215
Because the United States Supreme Court has held that individuals have a
heightened expectation of privacy for data stored on cell phones as compared to
physical containers, the way Runyan and Rann applied the private search doctrine
to digital devices is now outdated.216 Therefore, in applying the private search
doctrine, future courts are more likely to treat each digital file as its own
container when searched by the government.217
B. How the New Standard Applies to Other Containers
Courts can apply the doctrine’s narrower approach to digital devices other
than cell phones so long as a court can draw an analogy from modern cell phones
(in Riley’s analysis) to other personal digital devices, like the laptop in
Lichtenberger.218 The Sixth Circuit in Lichtenberger had no problem relating
Riley’s analysis to laptop computers, because it was the qualities of cell phones
that were of particular importance to the United States Supreme Court when it

210. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463.
211. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014).
212. Id. at 2488–89.
213. Id.
214. See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying the private search
doctrine narrowly to a personal digital device with similar characteristics with a cell phone).
215. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46 (in both Lichtenberger and
Johnson, the government could not “exceed the specific files viewed in a prior private search”).
216. See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488 (applying the private search doctrine narrowly to a personal
digital device with similar characteristics with a cell phone).
217. See id. (treating the individual files on the laptop as their own containers for purposes of the private
search doctrine).
218. See id. at 487 (using Riley as instructive for the search of a laptop computer).
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decided Riley.219 The Sixth Circuit used the reasoning behind the Riley Court’s
decision, noting that cell phones are in fact just “minicomputers that also happen
to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.”220 This fact, combined with the
idea that cell phones have immense storage capacity capable of keeping data over
long periods of time, is what the Lichtenberger court found particularly
instructive.221 Thus, the application of a narrower private search doctrine to
personal digital devices other than cell phones seems appropriate if the devices
have these qualities.222
Following that reasoning, courts could likely apply the private search
doctrine to tablets and desktop computers.223 These two types of computers are
very similar to both cell phones and laptops because they are computers with
immense storage capacity.224 But it is questionable whether courts could similarly
apply the doctrine to netbooks225 or smart watches.226 Netbooks have
considerably less storage capacity,227 which was important to the Riley court in
distinguishing cell phones.228 Smart watches are somewhat similar to modern
phones because they run applications and show media.229 However, they are not
stand-alone devices like a computer.230 They are instead designed to link with a
modern phone, and without such a link, their capabilities are very limited.231
Thus, for smart watches that have little storage capacity, and are used mainly as
an easier way to receive information from a person’s phone, there are not many
privacy interests at stake.232
Therefore, because the broader private search doctrine standards for digital
devices are outdated, and because future courts will likely be able to relate other
personal digital devices to Riley’s analysis, future courts will probably apply the

219. Id.; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (discussing qualities of cell phones).
220. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 487 (quoting Riley v. California).
221. Id. at 488.
222. C.f. id. (narrowing the private search doctrine for the search of a laptop computer because laptops
share similar qualities with cell phones under Riley v. California’s analysis that cell phones implicate
heightened privacy interests).
223. What Are the Different Types of Computer?, supra note 10.
224. Id.
225. Net books are smaller and lighter versions of laptops, with much less storage capacity. Id.
226. A smart watch is a personal digital device that links to smart phones and shows information. Robert
Valdes & Nathan Chandler, How Smart Watches Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://electronics.howstuffworks.
com/gadgets/clocks-watches/smart-watch.htm (last visited Feb 11, 2017) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
227. What Are the Different Types of Computer?, supra note 10.
228. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
229. Valdes & Chandler, supra note 226.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (discussing qualities of cell phones while noting the heightened privacy
interests involved).
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narrower private search doctrine to searches of both cell phones and similar
devices like desktop computers, laptops, and tablets.233
VII. ADVOCATING A NEW EXCEPTION TO THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE—A
CELL PHONE IS AS PRIVATE AS THE HOME
Cell phones are a growing necessity in the lives of every day Americans—so
much that they appear as part of human anatomy.234 The rationale underlying
Riley—especially the comparison between phones and the privacy interests in
homes—brings up a new question: are phones as private as the home?235 And if
so, should the private search doctrine be used to search them?236 This Part
considers first how the private search doctrine affects government searches of
homes,237 and then compares the application of the private search doctrine to
phones.238 This Part argues cell phones, and similar electronic devices, should be
exempt from the private search doctrine altogether.239
A. The Doctrine’s Application to the Home
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether the private
search doctrine allows a warrantless search of a home, and circuits are divided on
the issue.240 However, the private search doctrine has long-standing roots in the
Court’s authority.241 This fact has been troubling to courts considering the issue,
despite the doctrine’s solid foundation in the Fourth Amendment, since the
warrant requirement applies only to government actors.242
The Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the issue most recently,
claiming serious reservations about allowing the private search doctrine to apply
to the search of a home.243 In holding that the doctrine could not be used for a
warrantless search of a home, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited its State
Constitution and the general notion that the “chief evil” the Fourth Amendment

233. See supra Part VI (illustrating these concepts).
234. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
235. See id. at 2491 (discussing the privacy interests surrounding phones).
236. Infra Part VII.
237. Infra Part VII.A.
238. Infra Part VII.B, VII.C.
239. Infra Part VII.
240. Eric Breslin, Can the “Private Search” Doctrine Serve as an Exception to the Federal and State of
New Jersey Constitutional Requirement That a Warrant Issued in Advance of a Search of a Private Home?,
MONDAQ (May 19, 2015), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (search “private search doctrine” and select first result).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. State v. Wright, 221 N.J. 456, 476 (2015).
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sought to protect against was physical entry of the home.244 That court reasoned
that the interests a person has in their home are entitled to the utmost respect
from unreasonable searches.245 The court noted how careful scrutiny always
follows the search of a private and intimate residence, because courts have
recognized homes as unique for centuries.246 “When it comes to the Fourth
Amendment, the home is first among equals,” and stands “at the Amendment’s
very core.”247
Regardless, not all courts have followed this same line of reasoning.248 There
are multiple cases that have once held that a warrantless search of a home,
following a private search, was justifiable under a private search theory.249 In
United States v. Jones, for example, the Fifth Circuit quickly concluded the
Fourth Amendment did not apply.250 Citing Runyan, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that as long as the “police view” is within the scope of the initial
private search, Fourth Amendment protections are not implicated.251
But there are still many courts that have refused to extend the private search
doctrine to residences, and for good reason.252 United States v. Allen, for
example, distinguishes Jacobsen.253 The package in Jacobsen contained only
contraband, the court explained.254 But the defendant’s motel was his temporary
abode, containing intimate and personal items.255 The defendant Allen had a
significant privacy interest in where he was living, when the private search did
not completely frustrate that interest because the motel manager viewed only

244. Id. at 466–67.
245. Id. at 467.
246. Breslin, supra note 240.
247. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
248. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.8(b) n.95
(5th ed. 2012).
249. See United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1978) (officer called into apartment after a
search by chief engineer); Lucas v. State, 381 So.2d 140 (Miss.1980) (neighbor invited officer to search
apartment); United States v. Jones, 421 F.3d 359 (5th Cir.2005) (manager asked police to join her upon reentry
of apartment); United States v. Miller, 152 F.3d 813 (8th Cir.1998) (police entry proper after manager entered
apartment and saw drugs); United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that a subsequent
police entry is no search if the prior private person entry was “reasonably foreseeable”); United States v.
Clutter, 914 F.2d 775 (6th Cir.1990) (police search was no search under Jacobsen because the officer learned
nothing on his own that he had not already learned from the private search); State v. Miller, 110 Nev. 690, 877
P.2d 1044 (1994) (police invited by babysitter); Peters v. State, 302 S.C. 59, 393 S.E.2d 387 (1990) (person
found LSD in sibling’s home, invited police on reentry).
250. Jones, 421 F.3d at 361–62.
251. Id.
252. See LAFAVE, supra note 248 (listing cases that have held that a private search does not allow
government entry of a residence).
253. United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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some of his possessions.256 Therefore, although many courts have upheld
searches of residences based on a private search theory, there remains good
reason to doubt that the Supreme Court of the United States will allow police to
make a warrantless entry of a premises simply because it was previously viewed
by a private party.257
B. Applying the Doctrine to Electronic Devices: Riley’s Policy Rationale
Despite courts’ disagreement on whether the private search doctrine extends
to homes because of the large privacy interests involved, Riley’s analysis
provides huge implications to the effect of the doctrine on phones and similar
devices.258 As Riley stated, phones often contain far more information than what
can be found in a house.259 This means that, given the growing importance and
widespread dependence on cell phones, warrantless searches that implicate the
privacy interests in these devices should be taken seriously.260
There is little question that courts afford the greatest protection to the home
under the Fourth Amendment, but this protection can arguably be extended to
modern cell phones, considering their unique qualities.261 A cell phone search
shows to the government “far more [information] than the most exhaustive
search of a house.”262 This fact alone creates huge implications for the future of
privacy in cell phones—if a cell phone can contain documents more personal and
private than what is stored away in a person’s home, yet the home is the most
protected place under the Fourth Amendment, then courts should afford similar
protections to the data stored on cell phones.263
Compared to the papers and effects inside a residence, Riley explained that
phones contain vast amounts of information that are far more private in nature.264
For example, modern cell phones store enormous amounts of location data: the
phone’s location where each call was made and received, the location of every
Wi-Fi network joined, and even photos taken with the camera contain “geotag[s].”265 Applications intended for chatting with friends, even when supposedly

256. Id.
257. LAFAVE, supra note 248.
258. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (explaining the privacy interests in cell
phones).
259. Id.
260. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (holding that, generally, officers should get a warrant before searching
cell phones).
261. See id. at 2491 (a phone contains sensitive records).
262. Id.
263. C.f. id. (stating that phones contain more information than a house, opening an opportunity to
analogize the privacy interests in cell phones to those interests in the private home).
264. Id.
265. Rob Lekowski, What Lawyers Need to Know About Data Stored on Mobile Devices, LAW TECH.
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secure, store records on the phone.266 People can always retrieve messages, with
their respective time stamps.267 Someone searching for data can restore full
browsing history even when the phone’s owner deletes it.268 Certain applications
that use images, like Snapchat, store images on the phone even when the user
does not intentionally save them via screen shot.269
It is important to consider the large amount of the data stored on a modern
phone, in addition to people are using them more often—becoming increasingly
dependent on their functionalities.270 For heavy users, the amount of data stored
on these devices is staggering.271 Because of this, it is understandable why the
Riley court stated that modern phones contain more private information than a
home.272
As technology advances and as people become increasingly dependent on
their cellular phones, it will also become increasingly important to protect the
data they will contain.273 Therefore, this Comment urges that, based on Riley’s
analysis and on the continuing dependence on cell phones, they should be exempt
from the private search doctrine in the same way they were exempt from the
search incident to arrest exception.274
C. Applying the Legal Standard
A private search of a cell phone will rarely provide the “virtual certainty”
required for all of the data an officer may view during a search.275 As the
Lichtenberger court explained its application of the doctrine, “[to stay within the
scope of the private search, the officer] had to proceed with ‘virtual certainty’
that the ‘inspection of the laptop and its contents would not tell him anything
more than he had already been told by [the private party].’”276 But with the vast
amount of data contained in a cellular phone, it is a heavy task for an officer not
to learn anything more while navigating the device.277

TODAY (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2015/02/data-stored-on-mobile-devices/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (phones are a pervasive part of daily life).
271. Lekowski, supra note 265.
272. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
273. See id. at 2484 (phones are a pervasive part of daily life).
274. See id. at 2495 (search incident to arrest does not apply to cell phones).
275. See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2015).
276. Id.
277. Lekowski, supra note 265; See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (phones have immense storage capacity and
contain a plethora of information).
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For example, if a police officer wishes to view an incriminating text message
that was previously viewed by a private party, the officer would need to open the
messages application.278 But upon opening the application, they would be
confronted with different “threads” of conversations, showing the most recent
message in each thread.279 Therefore, an officer would inevitably see portions of
multiple conversations, while trying to find the one incriminating text.280 This
demonstrates that the nature of the display of information makes it very difficult,
if not almost impossible, for an officer to search through the contents of a
modern cell phone without learning anything more than the private party had
learned during the initial search.281 Or, at the very least, it would be very difficult
to tell if the officer viewed only what the private party viewed.282
With the risks of discovering new information so high, combined with the
fact that phones store a plethora of data just as private as information contained
in the home, this Comment urges that the scale weigh in favor of the
individual.283 The risks of infringing on such privacy interests are too great, and
so the private search doctrine should not apply to modern cellular phones.284
VIII. CONCLUSION
After Riley v. California, the nature of electronic devices greatly increases
the privacy interests at stake when the government searches them, “adding
weight to one side of the scale when the other remains the same.”285 When a
police officer searches a digital device, like the laptop in Lichtenberger, the
heightened privacy interests instruct the use of a narrower standard—treating
each digital file as its own container.286 And when applying the private search
doctrine’s “virtual certainty” standard, it is unlikely a police officer could search
a device like a modern phone without learning more information, risking the
privacy interests at stake.287
278. See Scott Lowe, Tweak Your Message Viewing Options in iOS and Android, TECHREPUBLIC (Dec.
15, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/smartphones/tweak-your-message-viewing-options-inios-and-android/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how to rearrange
messages, while showing they are viewable in the same phone application).
279. Id.
280. See id. (showing that threads are viewable at one place).
281. See id. (text conversations are displayed on the same page).
282. C.f. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that it was unknown
whether the officer viewed thumbnails that the private party had not viewed).
283. See supra Part VI (explaining how officers may be likely to learn new information while searching
and how the expectation of privacy in cell phones is high).
284. See supra Part VII.C (showing that the risks of infringing on privacy interests when an officer conducts a
phone search are great).
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Given the ever-growing dependence on technology, future courts are likely
going to use the narrower standard.288 And in the interests of each individual
citizen, and the millions of phones and laptops involved, the private search
doctrine should not apply to them because the risks of infringing on privacy
interests are too great.289

immense storage capacity and contain a plethora of information).
288. See supra Part V (arguing that future courts are likely to use the narrower private search doctrine
standard).
289. See supra Part VI (explaining why the doctrine should not apply to phones and similar devices).
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